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INSURANCE OF THE PERSON
Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Franks' involved a life insurance
policy taken out by the husband naming his wife as beneficiary.
Subsequently, the husband and wife were judicially separated and
entered into a community property settlement. Although the insur-
ance policy was not expressly mentioned in the property settlement,
the settlement contained a catch-all clause conveying all other com-
munity property to the husband. The couple was later divorced, but
the named beneficiary of the policy was never changed. Upon the
death of the husband, a contest developed between the ex-wife and
the administrators of the succession. The Louisiana supreme court,
correctly distinguishing between the insurance policy and the death
benefits thereunder, held in favor of the divorced wife as named
beneficiary. The insurance policy was community property trans-
ferred by the settlement, and the deceased was entitled to all owner-
ship rights thereunder including the right to change the beneficiary.'
However, the right to the death benefits is determined solely by the
terms of the policy.' Death benefits payable to a named beneficiary
were not community property at the time of settlement and did not
form part of the deceased's succession at death.4
The court of appeal in Morein v. North American Company for
Life and Health Insurance,' emphasized. again that there must be
strict compliance with the policy requirements in order to effectuate
a change of beneficiary.' The court also overturned a trial court award
* Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
Bar.
1. 278 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973).
2. See Pollock v. Pollock, 164 La. 1077, 115 So. 275 (1928).
3. "The death benefits of the life insurance policy were never community prop-
erty, for there was a named beneficiary other than the estate of the insured. Death
benefits payable to one other than the estate are not part of the community of acquets
and gains, and they were not here made a part of that community through the settle-
ment agreement. We need only examine the contract of insurance, therefore, to deter-
mine to whom are due the funds on deposit." Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Franks, 278
So. 2d 112, 114 (La. 1973).
4. The decision is in keeping with the jurisprudential determination to treat the
transfer of funds through a life insurance policy as sui generis governed by the contract
alone. See Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930).
5. 271 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
6. See, e.g., Guiffria v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 La. 837, 178 So. 368 (1938);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Murtagh, 137 La. 760, 69 So. 165 (1915). The courts of some
states are not as strict as Louisiana, applying an "all that he can do" test. However,
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against the agent which had been predicated upon his alleged negli-
gence in failing to "follow through" timely in assisting the deceased
with the change of beneficiary. The court found there was no duty
owed by the agent to the "new" beneficiary.
INSURANCE ON PROPERTY
In Brewster v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co., 7 the
plaintiff formerly owned property which he conveyed to his sons for
a recited cash consideration. A house on the property was insured in
the father's name prior to the sale. When the house was destroyed by
fire after the sale, the insurer refused to pay the proceeds to the
father, contending that he no longer had an insurable interest. Per-
mitting oral testimony to establish that the parties to the sale in-
tended for the father to retain the right of occupancy of the house,
the court concluded that he had an insurable interest as defined in
R.S. 22:614.1 The court properly applied the statutory test under
which the inquiry is whether the insured had a substantial economic
interest in the preservation of the property and awarded the face
amount of the policy, citing R.S. 22:695(A)9 (valued policy law).
There was no discussion of subsection E of that statute'" which appar-
ently was a legislative attempt to limit recovery to the value of the
insurable interest in situations such as the instant case."
the Louisiana approach is preferable in that the change of beneficiary should be ac-
complished soley by compliance with the policy to give added certainty to these valua-
ble contractual rights and to protect against capricious expressions of the insured on
which he may not carry through after cooler reflection. The Louisiana courts have
found an effective change of beneficiary upon substantial compliance with the policy
terms where the original beneficiary prevented full compliance. See, e.g., Smith v.
American Nat. Ins. Co., 25 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
7. 274 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
8. LA. R.S. 22:614(B) provides: "'Insurable Interest' as used in this Section means
any lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety or preservation of the sub-
ject of the insurance free from loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage."
9. "(A) Under any fire insurance policy ... the insurer shall pay to the insured,
in case of total destruction ... the total amount for which the property is in-
sured .. "
10. "(E) Liability of the insurer, in the event of total or partial loss, shall not
exceed the insurable interest of the insured in the property and nothing herein shall
be construed as precluding the insurer from questioning or contesting the insurable
interest of the insured."
11. In Lighting Fixtures Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 146 So.
35 (1932), the court held that a lessee's recovery under fire insurance on fixtures which
were to become the property of the lessor upon termination of the lease was limited to
the value of the right to use the fixtures for the remaining term of the lease. The Forge,
Inc. v. Peerless Casualty Co., 131 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) and Southern
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LIABILITY INSURANCE
The most interesting insurance case decided by the Louisiana
supreme court, Jackson v. Lajaunie,'2 involves a set of facts which one
might suspect was lifted from a law school examination. Plaintiff,
while a customer in defendant's filling station, was shot in the chest
by the defendant who fired the pistol as a prank believing it loaded
with blanks. The defendant had a garage liability policy and personal
liability coverage under a homeowner's policy. The court held there
was coverage under the garage liability policy,' 3 finding no require-
ment that liability arise out of a condition of the premises or a neces-
sary operation of the business.'4 Broadly interpreting the Garage Lia-
bility Hazard, the court pointed to the fact that the plaintiff was a
customer paying for his gasoline when the shooting occurred.
On the other hand, the supreme court found there was not cover-
Produce Co. v. American Insurance Co., 166 So. 2d 59 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) con-
strued a 1952 amendment to R.S. 22: 695(A) as overruling Lighting Fixtures to permit
recovery of the face value of the policy. Shortly after Southern Produce was decided,
subsection E was added. Subsequent decisions have not allowed insurers to use subsec-
tion E to defeat recovery by owners of the face amount under subsection A. Harvey v.
General Guar. Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967). However, in a footnote
in Harvey, the court made the following observation: "Actually, the probable purpose
of the amendment is to overrule decisions applying the valued policy law in situations
such as in Forge v. Peerless Casualty Co., La. App. 2d Cir., 131 So. 2d 838 and Roberts
v. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., La. App. 3d Cir., 168 So. 2d 457, where the policy
holder did not possess full or undivided ownership of the property destroyed, so that
his actual insurable interest was only for a proportion of the total property destroyed.
See Lighting Fixture & Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 146 So. 35."
201 So. 2d at 693 n.4.
See also Roberts v. Houston Fire & Cas. Co., 168 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964). In Brewster the court found the father "retained the right of occupancy." There
was no finding that he was owner of the improvements. Presumably, his "insurable
interest" was limited to the lifetime right of occupancy. It is submitted that the
father's interest was similar to that of a lessee's, and the court should have dealt with
subsection E.
12. 270 So. 2d 859 (La. 1973).
13. The insuring clause in the garage liability policy read as follows: "The Com-
pany will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of: A. bodily injury or; B. property damage; to
which Part 1 applies, caused by accident and arising out of the 'garage operation'
hazard."
The Garage Operations Hazard was defined as: "The ownership, maintenance or
use of the premises for the purposes of a garage, and all operations necessary or
incidental thereto, hereinafter called 'garage operations.'" Id. at 861.
14. The court of appeal had held that the "[ulse of the pistol for purposes of
pranks cannot be considered an act 'arising out of a garage operations hazard' within
the clear meaning of the policy language even though the incident occurred on the
business premises." Jackson v. Lajaunie, 253 So. 2d 540, 544 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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age under the homeowner's policy. Although the "business pursuits"
exclusion was found inapplicable,' 5 the court ruled out coverage
under the exclusion for "any act or omission in connection with the
premises [other than the insured premises] . . . which are owned,
rented or controlled by an Insured." Finding the phrase "in connec-
tion with" was even broader than "arising out of" as used in the
garage policy, the court held that the negligent act occurred in
connection with the station. Two justices dissented, suggesting that
"in connection with" required causal relationship with the premises."
In Graham v. American Casualty Co. 7 and Deane v. McGee
decided last year, the supreme court permitted stacking of uninsured
motorist benefits under two or more policies. The court found that
the "other insurance" clauses in the policies designed to prevent
stacking were invalid as they were in conflict with R.S. 22:1406.11
Relying on Graham and Deane, the courts of appeal made further
extensions this year. In Crenwelge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. ,1 the plaintiff was injured through the negligence of an
uninsured motorist while driving one of two cars he owned, both of
which were insured under separate State Farm policies. Each policy
clearly excluded coverage while occupying another automobile owned
by the named insured."' Construing the Graham and Deane cases as
15. This exclusion provided that the policy did not apply: "(a)(1) to any business
pursuits of an Insured except . . . activities therein which are ordinarily incident to
non-business pursuits .. "
The court reasoned that practical jokes are ordinarily incident to non-business
pursuits. The supreme court did not expressly mention the exclusion for intentional
conduct, but the court of appeal had held it inapplicable because there was "no
evidence in the record that Mr. Lajaunie intended to cause any bodily injury to Mr.
Jackson .. " Id. at 545.
16. Apparently to avoid any inconsistency with their concurrence in the finding
of coverage under the garage liability policy, the dissenting justices pointed out that
insuring clauses are to be broadly construed in favor of coverage whereas exclusions
are to be strictly construed against the insurer. However, this double standard might
lead to the ultimate absurdity of the same phrase being given two different interpreta-
tions depending upon whose ox was being gored. In fact, there appears to be very little
basis for distinguishing the meanings of "arising out of" and "in connection with."
17. 261 La. 85, 259 So. 2d 22 (1972); Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 145 (1972).
18. 261 La. 686, 260 So. 2d 669 (1972); Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 145 (1972).
19. LA. R.S. 22:1406 requires automobile liability insurers to provide uninsured
motorist coverage "in not less than" the minimum limits under the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Law. LA. R.S. 32:872 (Supp. 1952), as amended by La. Acts 1962,
No. 495 § 1; 1967, No. 24 § 1, No. 106 § 1; 1968, No. 600 § 1; 1970 No. 623 § 1.
20. 277 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
21. " 'This policy does not apply under Part IV: (a) to bodily injury to an insured
while occupying an automobile (other than an insured automobile) owned by the
named insured or a relative or through being struck by such an automobile.'" Id. at
158.
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requiring that each policy provided the statutory minimum coverage,
the court held that the insured was entitled to recovery under both
policies." In Smith v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,23 the plaintiff
was injured through the joint negligence of two motorists, one insured
and the other uninsured. As the limits of liability of the insured
motorist were inadequate,24 the court permitted the plaintiff also to
recover from his own uninsured motorist carrier, finding the "reduc-
tion" clause 5 in the plaintiff's policy unenforceable in light of R.S.
22:1406.25 These decisions overload a statute already strained to fa-
tigue by Graham and Deane.27
In Tingstrom v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,2"
22. Earlier, in Elledge v. Warren, 263 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972) another
panel of the same court held the same exclusion invalid where recovery was sought for
injuries received through the negligence of an uninsured motorist by the named in-
sured's son while riding his own uninsured motorcycle. The court concluded that a
motorcycle was an "automobile" within the meaning of the exclusion, but that the
exclusion was ineffective as in conflict with R.S. 22:1406. There is a persuasive concur-
ring opinion suggesting the exclusion was valid and the decision would be more soundly
based upon a conclusion that the motorcyle is not an automobile. The Crenwelge panel
specificially noted that it was expressing no opinion on the Elledge decision or whether
the exclusion would be ineffective in preventing recovery by an insured while occupy-
ing another owned but uninsured automobile.
23. 270 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
24. The total judgment was $18,567.35. Only $10,000 in coverage was available to
the insured motorist. The plaintiff carried uninsured motorist coverage with applicable
limits of $5000.
25. "Any amount payable under the terms of this Part because of bodily injuries
sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured under the Part shall be reduced
by
"(1) All sums paid on account of such bodily injury by or on behalf of (i) the
owner or operator of the uninsured automobile and (ii) any other person or organization
jointly or severally liable together with such owner or operator for such bodily injury
.. .and
"(2) The amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable on account
of such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law, disability benefits law
or any similar law." Id. at 641.
26. Previously, Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971), held
the reduction clause ineffective with regard to workmen's compensation benefits paid
to the insured.
27. In dicta in the Crenwelge decision, the court indicated that provisions requir-
ing credit of medical payment benefits against the uninsured limits would likewise be
held ineffective. However, the insurer in Crenwelge was not claiming credit. The same
circuit has permitted credit both before and after Deane and Graham. Robinson v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 267 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Bailes v. Southern Farm Bur.
Cas. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971). Since medical payments coverage
is not required by statute, there appears to be no valid ground for refusing to enforce
such credit provisions.
28. 274 So. 2d 911 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), writ denied, 279 So. 2d 202 (La. 1973).
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the issue was whether a minor in military service stationed in another
state was a "resident" of his father's household. The court held that
he was not, thus extending coverage under the minor's policy to an
accident which occurred while the minor was driving his father's
automobile." This decision is difficult to reconcile with Taylor v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ,o in which the court
extended coverage by finding that the "legal residence" of the minor
remained with his father.3
In Carlton v. Great American Insurance Co.,32 a 'compromise
settlement was set aside on the ground of error because of misrepre-
sentations as to the amount of insurance coverage. 31 In Louisiana
Insurance Guaranty Association v. Guglielmo,3' the court held that
coverage under the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Law is determined
by the date the insurer became insolvent and not the date the claim
arose, thus extending protection to claims which arose prior to the
effective date of the Act where the insurer became insolvent after that
date.
35
29. The father's automobile was insured by State Farm under a separate policy
which provided the primary coverage. The issue was whether a policy on the son's car
was also applicable. For coverage under the son's policy, the father's auto must qualify
as a "non-owned automobile" defined in the policy as "an automobile or trailer not
owned or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative." A
"relative" was defined as a "relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same
household." Id. at 915. (Emphasis added.)
30. 248 La. 246, 178 So. 2d 238 (1965).
31. The only factual distinction was that the minor in Tingstrom was in military
service. However, the court correctly noted that the minor remained domiciled with
his father, which was the basis of the finding in the Taylor case.
32. 273 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), writ denied, 277 So. 2d 442 (La. 1973).
33. The adjuster represented that only one policy with limits of $5000 was applica-
ble when in fact there was excess coverage. The claim was settled for $4900. The
decision is unclear whether the adjuster had actual knowledge of excess coverage
available to the insured, but the court concluded that the adjuster was "charged with
constructive knowledge" of what information the insured had regarding his own cover-
age. Id. at 659. Finding the misrepresentation as to coverage the principal cause for
the low settlement, the court held that it was not necessary to prove fraud. Id. at 661.
34. 276 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), writ denied, 279 So. 2d 690 (La. 1973).
35. The effective date of the Act was September 1, 1970.
